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Abstract 
Disruptive innovation has been described in the literature as a force that sweeps aside existing tech-
nology and business models.  This paper presents a case study that aims to understand the disruptive 
nature of digital innovation.  It questions how and why digital innovation comes to have (or not) a dis-
ruptive effect. It describes a case study of App and mobile innovation and offer preliminary findings of 
the case.  It argues that digital innovation based on App and mobile technology development could 
offer a different model of disruption than has been discussed in traditional literature on disruptive in-
novation that is largely based on manufacturing. 
 
Keywords: disruptive digital innovation, disruptive innovation, digital innovation, car sharing rides, 
Uber. 
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1 Introduction  
The term disruptive innovation was coined by Christensen in 1997 in his book ‘Innovator's Dilemma: 
When new technologies cause great firms to fail’.  The book discusses innovation in the industrial sec-
tor.   It is largely based on the economics of Schumpeter that innovation is a necessity for any activity 
that seeks profit and an essential driver of competitiveness and economic dynamics (Hanush and Pyka 
2007).   For Schumpeter, innovation is at the core of economic change as it causes what he described 
as, “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1942).  Christensen has followed this influential1 initial book 
with many other publications on disruptive innovation.   
The notion of disruptive innovation has been developed to explain innovation in the industrial sector 
and how entrepreneurs and small entrants to the market could offer products that could ultimately re-
place established offerings.  The assumption is that large companies are not interested in small emerg-
ing markets and are too slow to take decisions to adopt new technology.  Production lines, technologi-
cal and labour capability, and the need to attend to existing customers are seen to be stifling large 
players from attending to the low end of the market allowing new entrants to disrupt (Christensen 
1997; Christensen and Raynor 2003).   This view portrays the incumbents as rather helpless players in 
this innovation battle.    
However, the development and wide spread of digital technology has paved the way for a new class of 
innovation namely, digital innovation.  Digital Innovation is “the carrying out of new combinations of 
digital and physical components to produce novel products.” (Yoo et al. 2010).  Yoo et al. (2010) ex-
plain that this term focuses on product innovation as oppose to process innovation that dominates the 
IS literature.    
Research in digital innovation is in its infancy and we know little about the nature of its disruptive im-
pact.  This research aims to understand the disruptive nature of digital innovation.  It questions how 
and why digital innovation comes to have (or not) a disruptive effect.  It does so through examining a 
case study of a current mobile-based application that provides taxi services.  The company that devel-
oped and run the App is called Uber.  It was formally launched in 2010 in San Francisco and since 
then spread out around the world to operate in over 250 cities.  Uber App serves as a current case of a 
digital innovation that has rocketed the market value of Uber to over 40 billion Dollars and is creating 
a storm of oppositions and lobbyists in many markets.  As this is an on-going research, we have begun 
data collection and intend to analyse this and further data to be collected applying an inductive logic of 
inquiry. 
This case study paper is organised as follows.  The second section after the introduction offers a brief 
review of research on disruptive innovation and digital innovation. The third section presents the re-
search method.  The fourth section presents the case study.  The fifth section discusses the preliminary 
findings.  The final section offers a brief conclusion to the paper.   
                                                      
1 A search at Google Scholar reveals that the initial book is currently cited by 12,087 scholarly publications.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Disruptive Innovation 
The term “disruptive technology” as coined by Christensen (1997) refers to a new technology having 
lower cost and different performance.  Its performance appears lower when measured by the tradition-
al criteria of performance as seen by mainstream customers based on existing mainstream technology 
but also has higher ancillary performance (Utterback and Acee 2005).  Christensen differentiates be-
tween two types of innovation; sustaining and disruptive. Sustaining innovation is about improving the 
performance of products in the existing mainstream market. However, disruptive innovation utilizes 
the speed of technological changes to either target the low-end of the market, open up a new market or 
a combination of both.  
Christensen (1997, p115) points out that disruptive innovations are technologically straightforward. 
They offer different product attributes such as a simpler design or lower price to cater for the low-end 
segment of the market.  At the first, the product or service is offered to the bottom of the market but 
then it continues to evolve and challenges the top of the market to ultimately replace existing competi-
tors. However, new market disruption means opening up new markets and creating a new customer 
base that is different from the existing customer groups. New market disruptions avoid early direct 
competition with mainstream products and services.  However, with the increase in user groups, im-
provement in product performance and innovations, disruptive innovation can offer a greater conven-
ience compared with older products, eventually attracting the mainstream consumer groups.   
Bower and Christensen (1995) explain that disruptive technologies introduce a very different package 
of attributes from the one mainstream customers historically value as they are likely to perform far 
worse in one or two dimensions that are particularly important to those customers.  They suggest that 
at first, disruptive technologies tend to be used and valued only in new markets or new applications 
and offer the example of Sony’s early transistor radios that sacrificed sound fidelity but created a mar-
ket for portable radios by offering a new and different package of attributes namely; small size, light 
weight, and portability (Bower and Christensen 1995).  Products that are based on disruptive technol-
ogies are typically “cheaper, simpler, smaller and frequently more convenient to use.”(Utterback and 
Acee 2005).  The pattern of ‘disruptive innovation’ has three elements: 1) Technology that simplifies, 
standardizes and structures solutions. 2) Business models that deliver simple solutions affordably, ac-
cessibly and profitably. 3) A value network of companies that reinforce each other and form the infra-
structure. (Christensen et al. 2009) 
In his publications, Christensen discusses the impact of technological change and how established 
firms came to lead and then lag in developing and adopting new technologies compared to new entrant 
firms.  With Bower (1995) they state that “the most consistent patterns in business is the failure of 
leading companies to stay at the top of their industries when technologies or markets change.” (Bower 
and Christensen 1995).  They found that this pattern of failure is “especially striking in the computer 
industry” and gave examples of how IBM dominated the mainframe market but missed by years the 
emergence of minicomputers. Digital Equipment dominated the minicomputer market but missed the 
personal-computer market almost completely and Xerox let Canon create the small copier market. 
They explain that disruptive innovation occurs due to five inter-related factors.  These factors are: 1) 
Companies depend on customers and investors for resources. Customers drive internal decision mak-
ing because companies are resource-dependent.  New disruptive technologies do not initially meet the 
needs of mainstream customers and hence it is “nearly impossible” for companies to develop an ana-
lytically convincing investment case for diverting resources from current known customer needs in 
established mainstream markets to customers and markets that seem insignificant or do not yet exist 
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(Bower and Christensen 1995).  2) Small and emerging markets do not meet the growth needs of large 
companies and hence companies take delayed decisions to enter these markets.  Christensen (1997) 
finds that one of the reasons why established firms delay the introduction of new technologies is their 
fear of the cannibalizing of sales of their existing products.  However, when established firms wait 
until a new technology has become commercially mature in its new applications and then launch their 
own version of the technology only in response to an attack on their home markets, the fear of canni-
balization can become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Christensen, 1997).  3) Markets that don’t exist can-
not be analyzed. 4) An organization’s capabilities define its disabilities.  A process that creates the 
capability to perform one task concurrently defines disabilities to execute other tasks (Christensen and 
Overdorf 2000).   5) Technology supply may not equal market demand which means that there will be 
new technology in search of a new market.  Hence established organisations are focused on meeting 
their existing markets’ needs and they fail to adopt radically new technology that could appeal to dif-
ferent customers  (Christensen 1997; Christensen and Raynor 2003). 
Since existing processes can only support current tasks and at best evolutionary innovation or what is 
termed ‘sustaining innovation’, Christensen and Overdorf suggest that organisations need to create 
new processes and capabilities through new organisational space.  This new organisational space could 
take the form of a new organisational structure, making a spin out organisation to perform the new 
tasks or acquiring an organisation whose processes closely match the requirements of the new task 
(Christensen and Overdorf 2000; Dyer et al. 2013).      
Christensen and colleagues (1997 and 2013) define established firms as those that are established in 
the industry before the advent of the technology in question and who are using the legacy technology. 
From this perspective, entrant firms are those who are new to the industry at that point of technology 
change. Hence, a given firm would be considered as an entrant at one specific point in the industry's 
history but could be considered an established firm when technologies that emerged subsequent to the 
firm's entry themselves become subject to examination (Christensen et al. 2013). 
2.2 Digital Innovation 
IT innovation research has been traditionally focused on describing and explaining changes in the vol-
ume of technological and organizational change associated with IT innovation (Lyytinen and Rose 
2003b).  In their extensive review of IT innovation literature, Lyytinen and Rose (2003b, p. 558) show 
that the little research that has been done in understanding the nature of differences or “differences in 
kind” has been “narrow in scope and limited to description of changes as either fashions (Newell et al. 
2000) or imitations (Loh and Venkatraman 1990)” .  
However research on different aspects of Internet-based or digital computing suggest that it brings 
waves of innovation not only in systems’ development approaches (Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2004) 
but also in IT-based business models and services (Alter et al. 2001; Eaton et al. 2015; Srivastava and 
Shainesh 2015).  Authors recognize that “IT innovation theory needs to be expanded to analyze IT 
innovations in kind that exhibit atypical discontinuities in IT innovation behavior” (Lyytinen and Rose 
2003b).  However, the IT disruption model conceptualises the disruption of digital innovation from the 
internal view of the firm (Lyytinen and Rose 2003a) unlike the market impact of the innovation as in 
Christensen’s disruptive innovation model. 
Yoo et al. (2010) explain the unique characteristics of digital innovation as revolving around its repro-
grammability, homogenization of data, and the self-referential nature of digital technology (Yoo et al. 
2010).  It is not clear whether all types of digital innovation share the same characteristics and what 
are the relationship between these characteristics and the disruptive impact for some digital innova-
tions.  To understand this, it is important to understand the specificity of the digital innovation under 
examination and how these specific characteristics contribute (or not) to its disruptive nature.   In this 
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regard, this research aims to understand the disruptive nature of the digital innovation of the car shar-
ing services Uber.  It questions how and why this digital innovation comes to have (or not) a disrup-
tive effect. 
3 Research methodology 
This study adopts a qualitative case study approach.  It considers the case of Uber launch in different 
countries to have access to different types of responses to the introduction of Uber as a new innova-
tion.  Data collection comprises of news items, public statements, review of websites, Apps, petitions, 
legal statements and court suites and other documents.  In addition to secondary data collection, semi-
structured interviews with Uber drivers and management, mainstream taxi drivers and management, 
Uber’s other competitors, union representatives, and authorities is underway.  Fourteen face-to-face 
interviews have been conducted in London and Manchester.  Interviews were conducted between No-
vember 2015 and June 2016 while secondary data collection covers the period from Uber’s formation 
in 2010 till July 2016. As interviews took place in the middle of heated debate, tape recording was 
found to be discouraging to interviewee.  Instead, notes were taken during the interview and extended 
directly after each interview with the addition of observational notes.  In addition, notes regarding key 
sources that need to be investigated were also prepared after each interview as interviewees showed 
good awareness of competitors and challenges and encouraged researchers to validate information and 
read further about particular developments, incidents, an emerging competitor, newly launched apps, 
trade union blogs among others. 
Data analysis follows the inductive tradition.  Following the inductive tradition, empirical data, theo-
retical lens and the relevant literature were visited in a recursive way.  We followed analytical induc-
tion based on Goetz and LeCompte (1981).  Based on this perspective, analytical induction consists of 
four stages: (1) defining phenomenon in a tentative manner, (2) scanning data to identify categories, 
(3) developing typologies, (4) determining the relationships that exist among categories, and (5) con-
tinually refining categories until all are accounted for (Goetz and LeCompte 1981).  In this regard, the 
first phase of data analysis comprised the writing of the narrative of Uber’s history collecting and 
reading different types of documents to understand the chronological developments and verify infor-
mation.    In the second phase, broad categories were identified.  In the third phase, as our understand-
ing of the case study and its details developed, we engaged with the literature on disruptive innovation.  
The literature provided us with a sensitizing device for developing typologies and based on constant 
comparison between the data and the literature, we identified relationships between categories.  These 
categories and their relationships were continually refined based on recursive reading of case study 
and literature.  
 
4 Case study 
Uber is a transportation networking company (TNC) based in San Francisco. The company was 
founded in March 2009 by entrepreneurs Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp and officially launched in 
June 2010.  It acts as a third party contractor that connects customers and taxi drivers.  The company’ 
services are provided through a free App that can be downloaded on any smartphone.  It operates in 
collaboration with both Google maps and PayPal to provide customers a cheap way to hail and pay for 
taxis from their mobile phones.  The customer can access information such as the whereabouts of the 
nearest taxi, the name and rating of the driver and also track the route of the journey while in the taxi.  
Customers also negotiate and pay for the service electronically.  The App allows customers to request 
a taxi within a short period of time (usually 2-5 minutes) and set a meeting point with the taxi.  
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When demand for rides is higher than the supply of cars, surge pricing occurs, thus increasing the 
price. If the customer still wants a ride, the Uber driver shows the surge multiplier and asks the pas-
senger’s consent to that higher price. This has two effects: People who wait for a ride, decide to wait 
till price falls. Drivers who are nearby go to that location to get higher fees, bring the number of peo-
ple wanting a ride and number of available drivers together.  
After every Uber ride customers are rated by their Uber drivers, the same way the customers rate the 
Uber drivers. When a driver’s or customer’s Uber rating drops too far, they struggle to get rides or can 
even be excluded from the service entirely.  
Uber has expanded rapidly with the development of mobile technology. It is currently operating in 
approximately 270 cities worldwide.  In a short period, the company has risen in popularity and cur-
rently hold a market value of approximately $40 billion, “making it the world's most highly valued 
venture capital-backed start-up” (Picy and Abboud 2015).  The company investors include Mutual 
Fund Managers, Venture Investors, Fidelity Investment, Wellington Management, Summit Partners, 
Kleiner Perkins and Google Ventures.  The following sub-sections describe the market challenges Ub-
er faces. 
 
5 Findings  
5.1 International protests and social movements 
While rising in popularity, the company is facing backlash in many of the countries and cities it oper-
ates within.  This resistance is coming mainly from the taxi industry and trade unions.  Below are 
some examples of the backlash and resistance the company faces in different countries.  
In Australia, as reported in The Guardian on 10 September 2015, taxi drivers have staged rallies in 
Melbourne and Sydney and gathered outside the parliaments demanding state governments to outlaw 
the ride-sharing service UberX.  They chanted and carried signs “Shame on Uber”, “Stop illegal Uber” 
and “… taxi families and hire cars want justice” and also demanded the state transport minister to re-
sign. 
In a newspaper interviews, Taxi driver 1 said “We don’t want [Uber] regulated, we want them out,” 
Another warned: “If the minister won’t stop Uber, then we will stop Uber. If he doesn’t have the balls, 
we have the balls.” Another demonstrator said  “All the drivers as acknowledged by Roads and Mari-
time to be driving illegal, and Uber, through their App, are aiding and abetting them to drive illegal-
ly,”. Another driver, said “There’s not a level playing field. The taxi industry has a lot of fees to com-
ply with the regulatory environment, and Uber has cut a lot of those costs.”(Safi 2015). 
In Hong Kong, More than 100 taxis drove to the headquarters of the Hong Kong government protest-
ing against Uber.  They called for regulation to ensure that people offering rides through the Apps had 
taxi licence.“We are protesting against Uber drivers who are affecting our income,” a taxi driver who 
participated in the protests said to a new paper reporter (Soo and Feng 2015).  Other protesters are re-
ported to have said: “They don’t have the proper licence to operate,” and “If the government doesn’t 
take action, we will keep on protesting”. 
In France, Violent protests by taxi drivers were abruped in July 2015 and led to holding in detention 
two of Uber’s French executives by prosecutors. 
In Cambridge, Massachusetts in the US, taxi drivers held a strike to protest against Uber.  However, 
the reaction from Cambridge officials was expressed by the City Councilor “You guys realize the con-
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stituency that supports Uber is the majority and you’re the minority, right?” … “The state is about to 
make Uber legal — it’s about to make it fully legal, OK? And you guys are about to be in an even 
worse position.” (Adam and Newsham 2015). 
5.2 Legal actions 
Courts in France, Italy, Spain, Germany and China have cited UberPOP as illegal firm that does not 
conform with local transportation regulations and hence they have banned its operations.  Further legal 
challenges are pending in the UK, Netherlands and Belgium.  In France, the Constitutional Court up-
held a national law that banned one of Uber Technologies' car services that relies on non-professional 
drivers using their own vehicles which, of course, is its main business model.   
In London, Transport for London (TFL) have launched consultation plans that propose to include an 
interval of at least 5 minutes between ordering a car and the start of a journey, requirement for drivers 
to pass an English language test and a map reading test. In addition, they also suggest to oblige taxi 
firms to operate a landline telephone service, with bookings made up to 7 days in advance.  This con-
sultation plan came after Uber won its legal case in a London Court which stated that its App does not 
work as a taxi meter, effectively upholding the right of its drivers to work in London. 
In China, a law was enacted that bans private cars from offering rides via Apps.  Uber offices in 
Chengdu and Guangzhou were raided in April 2015 by the authority in their attempts to enforce the 
law. 
In New York, the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) approved in January a pilot project that al-
low cars no older than two years to become part of the city’s taxi fleet, reversing a nearly 20-year-old 
TLC requirement that only new cars be added.  Following this new regulations, Uber drivers are trans-
forming their black cars into traditional New York yellow taxis.  In doing so, once painted in yellow 
and joining the programme, previous Uber drivers can move to operate mainstream taxis operations.  
For example, they can use taxi stands in the city, taxi ranks at airport terminals, pick up street hails and 
get tips.  The TLC Commissioner said “If this pilot helps even a few drivers make a career decision 
that they otherwise wouldn’t have had the flexibility to make, then it will have been a 
success.”(Harshbarger 2015). 
5.3 Development of Competitive Apps   
We found that the market growth and profitability of Uber has attracted some new market entrants. 
The three biggest in the US are: Lyst, Side car, Curb.  
Lyft: Launched in 2012 in San Francisco. Like Uber, it uses a smart App where users can see a map 
with a pen at their location; it gives an estimate of how far the nearest lyft car is, with a button labelled 
‘request lyft’. Unlike Uber which is available in 58 countries, Lyft is only available in United States.  
Side car: Launched in 2012 in San Francisco, it has an App, with a map that marks your location and 
lets you know where the nearest Side car is. Its advantage over Uber is that passengers get to choose 
the car and the driver they desire. The App has lists of rides, photos of drivers and their cars, and fares 
charged. Although, just like Lyft, it is only available in United States.  
Curb: Founded in 2014, It is a company that connects people to safe reliable rides from fully licensed 
drivers. Like Uber, it is App based, with a map that marks your location and let you know how far the 
nearest Curb driver is. Rides can be booked either instantly or 24 hours in advance. Fares can be paid 
in the App with a credit card.  
In China, its Chinese competitors Didi Dache and Kuaidi Dache have merged in Feburary 2015 to 
form Didi Chuxing.  Didi and Lyft Inc. formed an international partnership which allows users of each 
Elbanna and Newman /Disrupt the disruptor in digital innovation 
 
 
Tenth Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems (MCIS), Paphos, Cyprus, September 2016 
 8 
 
 
App to hail rides from drivers of the other App when travelling to the other country with Didi invest-
ing $100 million in Lyft (Solomon 2016b). Payment is collected in the passenger’s native country to 
avoid the hassle of paying in foreign currency. For example, a Chinese member visiting the United 
States can use the Didi App to order and pay for Lyft rides, after which Didi will remit that money to 
Lyft. In May 2016, Apple as a large corporation has announced its investment of $1 billion in Didi 
Chuxing (Clover and Thompson 2016).  
In the UK, Kabbee: An App available for IOS and android users offers booking mini cabs in London, 
with an option to choose price, arrival time, punctuality and user rating.  Another App is Get taxi: 
available in IOS and android devices, it allows you to get a black cab in 2 clicks, with an option to pay 
within the App, if you are cash strapped, It is time tracking, locates your destination and lets you know 
how far the nearest taxi is. This is in addition to Hailo App which is available on both android and IOS 
devices, which allows you to hail black cabs on your phone. Like Uber, it locates where you are on the 
map and gives you a estimate of how long you will take for a taxi to arrive.  Flywheel: currently used 
by taxi companies. It is an App which allows users to order taxis on demand. Though not as fancy as 
Uber Cab, nor cheap like Uber X, it never experiences surge pricing.  
5.4 Uber is disrupted  
As a result of the setbacks in Europe, Uber has begun to concentrate its efforts in Europe on the more 
traditional car and driver services, which are staffed by professional drivers and are usually covered by 
national laws on taxi operators. Thomas Meister, a spokesman for Uber, said the laws governing 
transportation services in much of Western Europe dated back to the 1960s and were less flexible than 
in places that have updated theirs such as the United States or Mexico and asserted that "It's inevitable 
that ride-sharing and car-pooling services will become more common in Europe, but it is just going to 
take longer than elsewhere," he said before the court's pronouncement (Picy and Abboud 2015).   
To address the market criticisms, Uber’s operation and product has passed through a series of im-
provements.  These include making background check on drivers, requiring a commercial driving li-
cense for their drivers in some cities, improve features of the App including GPS tracking, sending to 
customer after booking, the driver’s name, picture and car registration number and also making use of 
market mechanisms of self-correction through customer’s evaluation/rating of drivers, .   
Also Uber is losing $1 billion a year as it tries to compete in China (The Guardian 2016).  Its CEO, 
Travis Kalanick, has admitted in Feburary 2016 “We’re profitable in the USA, but we’re losing over 
$1bn a year in China.  We have a fierce competitor that’s unprofitable in every city they exist in, but 
they’re buying up market share. I wish the world wasn’t that way. I prefer building rather than fund-
raising. But if I don’t participate in the fundraising bonanza, I’ll get squeezed out by others buying 
market share.”(Narvey 2016). Apple’s investment in Uber’s main competitor in China alongside the 
Lyft active international alliances programme with India’s Ola, Singapore’s Grab and China’s Didi 
formed what the press has called ‘anti-uber alliance’ is forecasted to increase Uber’s loses in interna-
tional markets the future (Carson 2016; Ramli 2016).  While Uber’s customer base is expanding very 
fast, its net operations are showing serious growth in losses.  According to a leaked confidential doc-
uments issued by the company to potential investors as part of it financing effort, its losses in the first 
half of 2015 is nearly 50% more than its entire year losses in 2014 (Efrati 2016).  Overall, the data 
in these documents show that Uber’s business remains unprofitable. “GAAP losses (net revenue minus 
cost of revenue, operating expenses and other costs) totaled $671.4 million in 2014. Those losses ex-
panded to $987.2 million in the first half of 2015.” (Solomon 2016a). 
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5.5 Uber is fighting back through Lobbying and legal actions 
In response to the ban in France an Uber spokesperson said, "While this is a disappointing judgment 
for Uber … it will not impact the service we offer in France today which is provided entirely by pro-
fessional drivers …We will continue to work with the French government on new, commonsense reg-
ulations that offer riders more affordable, reliable options and drivers new job opportunities." Uber has 
also tried to take the legal battle to the European Headquarter in Brussels by challenging the national 
laws and lobbying for more favorable treatment (Picy and Abboud 2015).   
In response to relaxing the regulations in New York to allow Uber drivers to transfer to mainstream 
New York Taxi, Uber said over a hundred yellow-cab drivers join it every week and earn more mon-
ey. The App gives more flexibility than garages that offer their drivers 12-hour shifts. (Harshbarger 
2015).  In addition, Uber has also spent millions of dollars on Lobbying activities (Kokalitcheva 
2015b) and has “ built one of the largest and most successful lobbying forces …at least a third 
more than Wal-Mart Stores” (Fox 2015). It consistently leverages Facebook’s News Feed and its 
App to solicit users and drivers to “take political action on their behalf” in order to defend its contro-
versial business model (Stempeck 2015). 
5.6 Uber patent Protection 
Since 2013, Uber has filled many patents applications to the US patent office (Patents Docs 2015). In 
November 2015, it has eight pending applications and has received seven rejections with one Notice of 
Allowance (Lee 2015). 
6 Discussion 
The case study presents the case of Uber and how the market reacted to its product and operation.  It 
shows that rather than having a market penetration attracting the customers who are seeking a simple 
and cheaper product then gradually improving its product to eventually become the main stream prod-
uct thereby removing the incumbents from their dominating position as the disruptive model of inno-
vation states.  Uber has faced fierce competition, protests, lawsuits and legal challenges.   In the face 
of the competition, Uber is incurring significant net losses per year. Although its product is going 
through improvements, it was pushed by the competition, by negative campaigns and by legal rulings 
to change  some of its product and operations features to resemble the mainstream incumbents.  The 
following sections discus Uber’s business model and product.  
6.1 Disruptive digital business model  
Uber’s business model and App exhibit characteristics of disruptive innovation and disruptive tech-
nology respectively.  It provides a cheaper and simpler taxi service which is consistent with the char-
acteristics of disruptive innovation as providing convenience and affordability to customers (Hwang 
and Christensen 2008).  The company’s business model is distinct when compared to the mainstream 
model of trained and recruited taxi drivers, with a formal knowledge-base, regulated calculated fees, 
and formal license.  It also departs from a model where a taxi service is bookable-in-advance, availa-
ble on dedicated taxi ranks on the streets or could be spontaneously stopped in the street.  Instead the 
business model of Uber is based on providing a cheaper more convenient service that could be booked 
instantly and is based on a “value network” where supplier-customer relationships between the mem-
bers of the network exist  through the mediating service of Uber (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998). Howev-
er, for Uber, all members of the network are customers .   
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6.2 Digital is imitable 
 
Christensen’s model of disruptive innovation was based on manufacturing where changing production 
lines present a major investment.  Hence, decision making is slow and incumbents tend to be reluctant 
to change their business model while the disruptor takes over the market and change the industry 
(Christensen 2013; Christensen and Overdorf 2000).  The case study shows that Uber’s innovation and 
business model is based on the development and operation of a mobile App.  The low cost develop-
ment of an App presents a low barrier to the market’s entry (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998).  As the Uber 
App is easy to imitate, it does not present a strong technology or product differentiation (Porter 1985).  
This invited other new companies to enter the market and offer similar services.  The new entrants to 
the market are competing fiercely with Uber causing, in part, the latter to incur net losses.     
 
6.3 The market impact of disruptive digital innovation 
The case study shows that the market impact of the digital disruptive model of Uber is different from 
the traditional disruptive model of innovation.  Unlike the typical expected reaction from incumbents 
in the traditional disruptive innovation models, the case of Uber shows that the current incumbents are 
strongly resisting the proliferation of Uber.  The incumbents developed their own Apps to digitally 
compete with Uber.  The low-cost of developing and operating an App make encourage incumbents to 
take decision to develop their own Apps in addition to their mainstream operations and compete with 
the disruptor.  The high-speed of developing Apps, wide penetration of mobile phone across popula-
tions and the existing digital literacy regarding using mobile Apps made it possible for incumbents to 
digitally cope faster than the traditional model of disruptive innovation suggests.   
In addition, Social actions and pubic protests against Uber’s operations were also seen in many cities 
around the world with trade unions and incumbents lobbying and seeking legal actions to ban Uber’s 
operations.  The disruptive of innovation model overlooks the actions of the disrupted.  However, the 
uses of social media and mobile phones have accelerated social mobilisations and public movements.  
Street protests, legal actions and court rulings has put significant pressure on Uber manifested by its 
financial losses.  
 
6.4 The digital competition 
While Uber is facing serious competition, protests and court rulings, it is also fighting back. It is also 
heavily lobbying in local governments and consumer groups (Palmer 2013) and in the US is consid-
ered “the largest lobbying forces in the country” with 250 lobbyists and 29 lobbying firms registered 
in capitols around the US (Fox 2015; Kokalitcheva 2015a; Kosoff 2014).  Uber is also trying to protect 
its App by applying for patent protection for features of its App.  However, it has not been successful 
in getting patent protection.    
Uber also contracted and resided to traditional business models in markets that banned its App and car 
sharing operations.  In markets, like New York, when the regulator adopted a positive stance allowing 
Uber’s taxi drivers to convert to mainstream taxi operations, Uber continues to Lobby in attempt to 
create an image that while drivers leave Uber, more join everyday. 
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While Uber is making financial net losses, the company was recently valued at $50 billion and is con-
sidered the most funded start-up in the world (BBC News 2015).   This presents a digital innovation 
dilemma that while the customer base of the company is growing rapidly, the nature of the digital in-
novation – as explained above - drives the cost of competition to grow even higher.   
 
6.5  Beyond the initial disruption: co-evolvement of digital innovation 
Following our inductive approach, we propose that disruption in digital innovation follows a co-
evolution trajectory where the disruptor business and the disrupted business co-evolve over time.  Dur-
ing this co-evolvement process, both parties go through changes in their business models and adoption 
of technology.  Following this co-evolution processes, none of the competitors diminish but they con-
tinue to co-exist and co-evolve creating a complex competitive and rapidly changing environment.  
App development is characterized by low cost of entry, high speed of App development, proliferation 
of mobile technology across populations and high technology literacy.  Together these characteristics 
create a low barrier to enter the market that encourages competitors to quickly catch up with the dis-
ruptor.  In addition, the widespread use of social media is empowering the disrupted groups to better 
communicate, organize and move to interfere and rise up against the disrupted organization.  Digital 
innovation based on App development and mobile technology does not make dramatic and complete 
disruption as presented in the ‘disruptive innovation’ literature and make this model difficult to be ma-
terialized.   
To sum, the rise of Uber is disrupted by networks in most European countries and cities.  They fol-
lowed a similar trajectory of strikes, legal actions and the initiation of competing App services.  This 
contradicts the traditional disruptive innovation model that expects incumbents to be fixated on their 
traditional markets and products and late in adopting the disruptive technology.  However, the adop-
tion and development of the described type of digital innovation (Apps) seems to be taking place faster 
allowing the emergence of different types of competition and imitations.  Also, the openness of Apps 
and the existence of different types of digital communication seems to allow different networks to 
converge and oppose any possible domination of disruptive business model.  This is a research in-
progress paper where data collection effort has just started.  
  
7 Conclusion 
The digital innovation market is more fluid than the manufacturing market.  The entry has low cost 
and high speed, which encourages an incumbent’s decision makers to move faster and at a lower cost.  
Due to fierce legal and other objections and competition, the operating cost of the disruptive company 
has increased significantly causing it to operate at a financial loss despite the increase in its customer 
base.  The business model based on an App is vulnerable to imitation where both incumbents and new 
entrants develop similar Apps.  The incumbents use the App in parallel with their mainstream opera-
tions as they benefit from the already available capability of  of mobile phone availability and popular-
ity among their drivers and the drivers competency of using it.  New entrants are adopting a similar 
business model to Uber while moving faster to create international alliances.  This is in contrast to the 
striking corporate stories of the traditional model of disruptive innovation where new entrants appeal 
to low-end customer base and gradually take over the market creating a new model for the industry 
that incumbents cannot cope with.  Also having an increased consumer base contributed to the high 
market valuation of the Uber in contrast to its growing loss making which raises questions regarding 
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who benefits from the digital disruptions and the digital economy.  Clearly, ore research is needed to 
examine the nature of the digital innovation, the digital market conditions and the nature of digital 
competition.  
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